

CIA GLOBAL WAR PLAN FOR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

CONCEPT OF CIA UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS IN ACTIVE THEATERS
OF WAR

1. CIA has the responsibility for supporting the Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations of the military in wartime and for peacetime preparation for such support, including operation of, and planning for conversion of, assets to satisfy military UW requirements insofar as its capabilities permit.
2. During peacetime, requirements for CIA support of the Military are developed by overseas military commanders in terms of UW areas in the countries of interest to them, usually in consultation with CIA Senior War Planner, and submitted to CIA by the JCS. With respect to regions for which no military requirements have been received, CIA will anticipate them and make whatever preparations are feasible. These requirements are the basis for preparatory actions taken in accordance with the provisions of Tabs A and E to Appendix 3. (Criteria paper and delineation paper on establishment and control of UW assets.)
3. In time of war, for operations in a theater where U.S. Forces are engaged in combat operations, CIA's operational integrity will be preserved as outlined in the Command Relationships Agreement. As a component force at theater level, the CIA Force Commander will receive UW missions from the Theater Commander; will make his own plans, and carry out operations in fulfillment of these assigned missions. The CIA Force's participation in joint task forces conducting unconventional warfare operations will be required from time to time, but only for the accomplishment of specific and limited actions requiring close coordination. During this time, the participating CIA Force elements will be attached for operational control to the JUWTF Commander.
4. The concept for the generation of operating UW forces envisages that established UW assets will expand, upon the outbreak of hostilities, into guerrilla warfare (GW), evasion and escape, or subversion operation mechanisms, or combinations of these types, depending upon what operational intelligence indicates can be developed in the area and upon the military situation and operational considerations at the time. Potential individual targets to be attacked and other activities to be conducted in each UW area will be included in detailed plans as they develop.
5. In selected UW areas, military UW teams will be infiltrated after the beginning of hostilities to organize and further develop operating UW (particularly GW) forces and to conduct UW operations. To the extent feasible, CIA will have assets in place to assist such military teams or will infiltrate agents for that purpose into the areas prior to introduction of the teams.

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINATION OF WARTIME MILITARY
REQUIREMENTS FOR CIA CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

REFERENCE: "Command Relationships Between the CIA Organization and the Armed Forces in Active Theaters of War Where American Forces are Engaged," revised 27 August 1957 (SM 621-57)

1. Wartime conventional military operations will be supported by a variety of unconventional, covert, or clandestine activities, conducted in part by military elements and in part by CIA. Requirements for CIA action in this connection will be defined in conformity with the following standards of scope, character, and degree:

a. Unconventional Warfare Operations: Within the Unconventional Warfare category, as it is defined, the following types of objectives are distinguished for the purpose of stating standards for the establishment of requirements on CIA:

(1) Demolition and Denial: This objective is destruction of targets, physically accessible to friendly forces, prior to enemy possession. CIA will not normally undertake such actions presuming that military forces are the more appropriate instrument. Exceptions will be undertaken by CIA only for high priority objectives which are clearly beyond the capability or opportunity of conventional military forces.

(2) Disruption of Enemy Activities and Resources: This objective, accomplished through Sabotage, Resistance, or Guerrilla activities, includes both (a) retardation or interdiction of enemy military operations in the initial phases of combat between conventional forces, and (b) action of broader scope and longer range to impair his ability to wage war, by extensive destruction of his basic resources and by incitation of widespread popular resistance to his control. The priority in use of assets developed by CIA, as between these two types of purpose, is a matter for determination by the U.S. military theater commander with the advice of the DCI or his authorized representative, after proper U.S. authorities have declared the area in question to be an area of active military operations. Prior to such declaration, the determination of use of assets is the responsibility of the DCI to be exercised after appropriate consultation with the military theater commander. It should be recognized in this connection that assets used for purpose (a) may be destroyed and unavailable for

purpose (b). In relation to this disruption objective, the optimum CIA role, in and prior to war, will be the establishment of action nuclei ready for exploitation by the DCI or appropriate military elements in accordance with the above responsibilities. Nuclei of this type, where possible, would be located within the area of potential operation, compartmented in accordance with the respective purposes to be served, and should be equipped with communications and supporting facilities. When this degree of preparation by CIA is not possible, CIA will undertake the following, separately or in combination as possible:

(a) To establish in the probable area of operational action at least one all-purpose agent organizer with communications who can gather operational intelligence and spot (but not necessarily recruit) personnel for the requirements in the area.

(b) To develop broader assets of a supporting character, not constituting independent action capability, to assist the primarily responsible elements of the Armed Services. Such assets will report operational intelligence, establish contact with local resistance potential, or provide reception, safehaven, or communications facilities and services.

(c) Where prewar establishment of assets resident in the denied area is not possible, to recruit and train, and hold externally, select cadres of agent and action personnel for wartime infiltration into the operational area.

After the beginning of war, CIA will undertake the even more exclusive action of development of assets to full operational readiness, or of CIA conduct of the operational action itself, only in the exceptional circumstances of targets critically important to military need where military capability and opportunity for conducting the operation cannot be developed, or where CIA has a unique capability for undertaking the action. In conformity with subparagraph b below, CIA will provide psychological, intelligence, and communications support for both CIA and military activities for these purposes.

(3) Evasion and Escape: This objective is denial to the enemy and, where possible, exfiltration of U.S. and allied military personnel and other select individuals, in or from enemy territory in wartime. CIA responsibility, for preparation prior to war and action in war, will be: To establish preliminary contacts or, as possible, assets from which E&E organization may be developed; to establish an E&E organization in support of the Military, such organization to be maintained or operated under DCI supervision prior to the declaration of an active theater, and to be maintained or operated in accordance with general CIA-Military command relationships after such declaration; and, in conformity with subparagraph b below, to provide communications and intelligence support and assistance, such as information concerning downed air personnel, for both CIA and Military E&E operations.

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TAB E TO APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX A

DEFENSE-CIA AGREEMENT

ON

ESTABLISHMENT AND CONTROL OF UW ASSETS AND OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF OVERT MILITARY OPERATIONS (S)

PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this document is to clarify the delineation of responsibilities between the Military Services and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the peacetime preparatory actions necessary to the development of a U.S. wartime UW capability.

GENERAL

2. Commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the conduct of UW in wartime. The development of a capability for the conduct of UW is therefore basically a military responsibility.

3. The CIA within its charter for covert operations is responsible, in accordance with established policies and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by international communism, to develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war. This includes, wherever practicable, provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces in time of war within active theaters of operations, as well as provision for staybehind assets and escape and evasion facilities. Thus, in peacetime, the CIA shares with the Military the responsibility for the development of a capability for the conduct of wartime UW.

4. In preparing for the conduct of UW in wartime in areas dominated or threatened by international communism, the United States must fully utilize the abilities of the Military and the CIA to develop in peacetime the required UW capabilities. It is a matter of finding the combination of those CIA and Military capabilities which together will give the maximum possible preparation for UW.

5. The U.S. UW concept is predicted, to a great extent, upon the use of indigenous peoples in areas dominated or threatened by international communism. The United States is also aware that UW capabilities will be developed by allied or friendly governments. Thus, the United States must consider the development of UW capabilities by:

a. The United States, unilaterally.

- b. The United States in conjunction with allied governments.
- c. Allied or friendly governments, unilaterally.

6. The methods employed in the development of UW capabilities will vary, depending on the area, existing conditions, and the purposes to be served. Wherever appropriate the choice of method to be used should be, in order of preference:

- a. Non-covert action.
- b. Non-covert action supplemented by covert action.
- c. Covert action.

RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will develop UW requirements and, in consultation with CIA as appropriate, will determine whether covert or non-covert preparatory action is involved.

8. Commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, within capabilities, are responsible for the development of a UW capability and the fulfillment of UW requirements, by non-covert actions.

9. The CIA, within capabilities, is responsible for the development of a UW capability, and the fulfillment of UW requirements, by covert action.

10. The closest Military-CIA cooperation and coordination will be required where the development of UW capabilities and the fulfillment of UW requirements involve non-covert action supplemented by covert actions. Discussions between the Military Commander and the CIA Senior War Planner (SWP) in the field should develop a procedure and establish a priority for the accomplishment of such tasks.

11. Military requirements for covert operations by the CIA will be carefully screened by commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and priorities for accomplishment by CIA established. Consideration should be given to accomplishment by other than covert means before fixing upon CIA as the instrument.

12. Non-covert UW requirements of the Military will, to the extent practicable, be undertaken by the Military elements of overseas commands. In instances, where the Military cannot meet the requirements, commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff may request the CIA to undertake the task. Acceptance by the CIA should not prejudice accomplishment of covert requirements. It is expected that such requests would be exceptional.

13. In addition to the selected UW areas contained in UW plans, the CIA will advise military commanders in the field, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of other areas which appear especially feasible for wartime UW or for peacetime preparation for wartime UW.

14. CIA has the responsibility for generation in peacetime of a capability (a) to carry out its peacetime mission, (b) to carry out its wartime mission of exceptional operations in relation to military theaters, and (c) to carry out CIA missions outside of military theaters. CIA plans for the wartime use of any such capabilities in support of military operations in war will be consonant with the war plans of military commanders and will be coordinated with such commanders. CIA covert action in peacetime to generate capabilities specifically for the support of military operations in wartime will be undertaken only if pursuant to approved military requirements or if otherwise agreed by commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

15. Full and continuous coordination on requirements and capabilities must be effected between the Military and the CIA, both in Washington and the field.

16. Commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for ensuring that the CIA Senior War Planner is informed as to non-covert preparations by the Military to develop UW capabilities.

17. The CIA is responsible for informing, through appropriate channels and on a need-to-know basis, agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives) of such covert operations as will affect them.

(TS) GENERAL.

a. The fundamental strategy of UW operations conducted by USCINCEUR will be to support SACEUR/USCINCEUR military operations by exploiting the resistance potential in areas dominated, or likely to be overrun, by enemy forces. The UW objectives are to:

(1) Interdict, harass or destroy the enemy communications, transportation and supply systems, installations and facilities.

(2) Cause strategic and tactical dispersal or concentration of enemy forces by means of the above.

(3) Provide the means for United States and Allied military personnel, military personnel of other friendly nations, and other selected individuals, to remain free and to escape from unfriendly territory.

(4) Create and strengthen active and passive resistance to hostile authority in selected areas.

(5) Report strategic and tactical intelligence information derived from UW operations.

(6) Assist United States sponsored indigenous leaders in establishing control over Soviet-Bloc social and political structures.

(7) Assist USCINCEUR/SACEUR in the establishment of military governments in appropriate areas.

b. On or before the outbreak of hostilities, Hq SOTFE will become operational and will have the primary responsibility of conducting UW operations in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility. COMSOTFE will assume operational control of the 10th Special Forces Group (Abn) upon its arrival at SFOB and of the SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group.

c. The wartime operations conducted by COMCIAEUR in support of UW will be substantially a continuation and intensification of peacetime activities. COMCIAEUR will activate, expand and develop indigenous

assets and supporting mechanisms in areas designated by USCINCEUR to assist in the infiltration of SFODs and to conduct Evasion and Escape and Subversion (Resistance) missions.

(TS) SITUATION.

Operations may be characterized by a very intense nuclear exchange for the first few days, followed by a longer period of reorganization and grouping of resources prior to the initiation of nuclear supported land, sea and air operations. The Allied nuclear attacks and the necessity for dispersion are expected to weaken or disrupt the Soviet ability to maintain effective direction of their political, security and police state systems. Under these conditions, significant defections of dissident groups and individuals will probably occur and spontaneous resistance groups responsive to US control and direction will be created. On the other hand, operations may be characterized by general war arising from military operations which were initially of a lesser scale and did not include a massive nuclear exchange. Regardless of how attained, general war will include tactical and strategic employment of nuclear weapons and can be expected to enhance conditions in which unconventional warfare (UW) will be pursued.

(TS) UW ACTIVITIES (Initial)

- a. The objective of UW operations will be to generate, organize, and equip indigenous resistance groups and to guide and direct their operations to support military operations by retarding the initial enemy offensive and to obtain intelligence for subsequent operations. The US UW effort will consist principally of operations conducted by special forces stay-behind mechanisms and indigenous assets. If the situation permits, SFODs, assisted by indigenous persons furnished by CIA, will be infiltrated into selected objective areas to organize and exploit resistance groups.
- b. Activities conducted by indigenous UW elements will be characterized by their clandestine nature and by the fact that many of these operations will be conducted in urban areas. Included in these activites are the following: sabotage, covert propaganda; infiltration into enemy installations; planned civil disobedience or non-cooperation; formation of groups as action nuclei for future guerrilla organizations and other activities designed to harass, deter or retard enemy political or military activites.
- c. E&E operations are initiated and expanded as rapidly as possible for the purpose of recovering the maximum possible number of isolated US and allied military and other selected personnel.

d. UW operational and supporting forces, equipment and supplies are marshalled at or near to the SFOB. CINCUSAREUR deploys the 10th SFGA to Orleans, France, establishes the SFOB and assembles troops and equipment required for support of UW operations. COMSOTFE assumes operational control of assigned or attached forces.

e. COMCIAEUR activates and establishes the SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group under the operational control of COMSOTFE. This element will direct the activities of those assets and supporting mechanisms which COMCIAEUR makes available in support of UW operations.

Definitions.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW). Includes covert operations as an integral part thereof and consists of three inter-related fields: Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, and Subversion.

Guerrilla Warfare (GW). Comprises those combat operations conducted in hostile territory by predominantly indigenous forces on a para-military or military basis, supported and directed to some extent by the United States. Their purpose is to reduce the combat effectiveness, war potential (industrial, economic, political and military) and morale of the enemy in support of military objectives or to gain political control of the state.

Evasion and Escape (E&E). Involves the procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals of United States, Allied and friendly countries are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or unfriendly area to areas under Allied control.

Subversion Against Hostile States.

Comprises actions within and against hostile areas by underground resistance groups and individuals of predominantly indigenous origin, supported and directed to some extent by the United States. Their purpose is to reduce the military, economic, psychological and political and political potential of the enemy. As the resistance gains strength its actions may become overt and shift toward combat operations of a guerrilla nature.

This Annex implements those UW planning and preparatory tasks included within Annex F "Unconventional Warfare" to the Current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(TS) CONCEPT.

Planning and preparatory actions during this period will provide the basis for the conduct of UW during general war and during limited war.

Pre-planned UW areas have been established based on available intelligence and significance of the areas to USCINCEUR plans. These areas will be evaluated annually, or more frequently if the situation so dictates, to insure currency and compatibility with changes to war plans. Based on these evaluations, area planning guidance will be developed and maintained by COMSOTFE. Utilizing this planning guidance as a basis, the 10th SFGA will develop and maintain operational plans for those areas planned for

their exploitation, and the CIA will develop and maintain operational plans for those areas planned for continued exploitation by CIA mechanisms. For the GW areas, CIA will also maintain plans detailing the reception and contact procedures to be performed by the assets upon deployment of Special Forces Operational Detachments (SFOD's).

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AREAS

(S) REFERENCES. Military Support Annex to CIA Global War Plans for Clandestine Operations dated 24 May 1961, published by CIA.

(S) PURPOSE. This Appendix provides a list of USCINCEUR's pre-planned UW areas and establishes the requirement commanders and CIA for preparation of supporting plans.

(TS) GENERAL.

a. An unconventional warfare area is a geographical area flexible as to boundary within or from which USCINCEUR plans to conduct unconventional warfare operations in furtherance of United States and/or allied military objectives.

b. UW assets are individuals, groups of individuals or organizations in-place or which can be placed in position to accomplish or support UW.

(TS) SELECTION OF AREAS.

a. The following factors have been considered in selection of UW areas. Such factors will be considered in the periodic re-evaluation of UW areas:

- (1) Requirements of other unified and specified commanders.
- (2) Requirements of component and subordinate commanders.
- (3) Suitability of terrain for use by UW force.
- (4) Indigenous UW potential in the vicinity.
- (5) Operational proximity to suitable targets for UW attack.

b. Certain UW areas have been selected in neutral and friendly countries to support initial repositioning of conventional forces from the general line now occupied by US or allied forces if required. Areas in neutral countries will be activated only in the event the country ceases to be neutral.

c. In all UW areas, Evasion and Escape and Subversion (Resistance) activities may be initiated prior to the introduction of SFODs. These activities will be expanded or modified as the SFODs are introduced into the area.

d. In those UW areas designated E&E/GW, Evasion and Escape and clandestine resistance activities will be conducted concurrently as required.

Report local capabilities for clandestine UW actions, trigger (clandestine UW activities and/or conduct UW as directed).

Render evasion and escape assistance to US and Allied personnel.

Additional Functions of Guerrilla Warfare (GW) Assets:

(1) Pending arrival of SFODs, continue development and exploitation of resistance potential.

(2) Arrange for reception of SFODs to include establishing contact between the detachment commander and potential guerrilla leaders.

EVASION AND ESCAPE

References;

- (1) USEUCOM Directive Number 55-27, Procedures for Processing Recovered Personnel (U).
- (2) USEUCOM Directive Number 55-14, Downed Crewman or Isolated Personnel Recovery Procedures (U).
- (3) Air Force Intelligence Center (AFIC) Safe Area Intelligence Descriptions (U).
- (4) Hq USAF (AFIN-3) Safe Area Briefs (U).
- (5) Air Force Intelligence Center (AFIC) Special Evasion and Escape Studies (U).

- (6) Evasion and Escape Manuals (AFM) 200-71, 200-72, 200-73, 200-74, 200-75, 200-76.
- (7) SM 355-61, subject: Defense-CIA Agreement on Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape (C).

Senior War Planner, Europe (SWPE).

- a. Provides CIA point of contact for E&E planning and arranges for CIA support in limited and general war.
- b. Keeps USCINCEUR and COMSOTFE informed as to CIA capabilities to conduct or support E&E operations.
- c. Receives and processes USCINCEUR's E&E requirements for CIA action.
- d. Informs USCINCEUR of CIA plans for E&E mechanisms to locate and recover isolated personnel located in Safe Areas listed in Appendix 4.
- e. Provides COMSOTFE and Component Commanders data on areas in which E&E assistance may be expected in hostile countries for inclusion in briefing of combat crews.
- f. Plans for the provision of CIA representation at debriefing centers established by COMSOTFE and the Component Commanders.
- g. Provides information and advises on the techniques and requirements of the E&E Fingerprint Identification System (EEFIS).
- h. Arranges for specialized training in E&E techniques, procedures and the use of peculiar equipment for theater UW forces as required.

DEFINITIONS

1. (S) Unconventional Warfare (UW). Includes covert operations as an integral part thereof and consists of three interrelated fields: Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, and Subversion.
2. (S) Evasion and Escape (E&E). That part of UW involving the procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals of United States, allied and friendly countries are enabled to emerge from an enemy held or unfriendly area to areas under Allied control.

3. (S) E&E Operations. Overt or covert operations conducted by a mechanism involving the contact, custody, identification, and coordination for exfiltration of recovered isolated personnel.
4. (C) Safe (Survival) Area. An area which offers to the evader a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until his evacuation can be undertaken. Survival area is synonymous with safe area and may be used interchangeably.
5. (S) Contact Area. An area in which the E&E mechanism establishes contact with the evader.
6. (U) Removal Area. An area from which evaders are evacuated.
7. (U) Evader. Any person who has been cut off or isolated behind enemy lines or in territory controlled or dominated by the enemy and who eludes capture.
8. (U) Escaper. Any person who gains freedom from enemy custody.
9. (S) E&E Assets or Mechanism. Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations in place or which can be placed in position to accomplish or support E&E operations.
10. (S) Evasion and Escape Fingerprint Identification System (EEFIS). A system for converting the description of fingerprints into a code which can be transmitted for the purpose of providing positive verification of identity.

Evasion and Escape Operations. Evasion and escape operations consist of the following elements:

- (1) Individual Action to Avoid Capture or to Escape. US military personnel isolated in unfriendly areas can evade capture, or recapture, if properly prepared for this eventuality. Successful evasion will be enhanced by the ability of the individual to avoid all contacts with unknown personnel in denied areas.
- (2) Survival During Period of Evasion. Combat personnel must be trained in survival psychology and techniques in order to be mentally and physically capable of surviving in the rugged and remote areas of the USSR and the satellite countries. Survival during an extended period of evasion should be anticipated.

(3) Assistance to Evaders/Escapers.

E&E operations will be conducted as an essential part of the unconventional warfare activities in each active Guerrilla Warfare (GW) area in which a US Special Forces Detachment is operating. The Special Forces Detachment commander within the area, utilizing friendly indigenous personnel, will seek out, provide safe haven and arrange for the recovery of US and allied military personnel, military personnel of other friendly nations and other selected individuals who are held as prisoners of war or who have evaded or escaped into Safe Areas within or proximate to active GW areas.

Certain forces responsive to COMCIAEUR and operating clandestinely within enemy territory are assigned the task of contacting and assisting the evader or escaper until he can be removed or evacuated to an area under friendly control.

COMSOTFE coordinates the two E&E assistance efforts.

(4) Identification and Recovery of Evaders/Escapers.

Evaders/escapers who have been contacted by an E&E mechanism should be positively identified before acceptance. It is the responsibility of the E&E organization to identify such personnel. As an aid, the Evasion and Escape Fingerprint Identification System (EEFIS) has been established. As circumstances permit, following acceptance by the mechanism, individuals will be processed through the E&E organization in order to provide for ultimate recovery and delivery to areas under friendly control. Recovery will be effected by ground, sea or air as appropriate.

Forces available and capable of either overt or covert recovery will be directed by USCINCEUR to support COMSOTFE. Recovery operations, irrespective of origin, will be coordinated with COMSOTFE in order to preclude duplicating or incompatible actions. Upon return to US control, recovered military personnel will be debriefed and processed in accordance with established procedures.

Availability of E&E Mechanisms.

Conditions affecting the availability of in-place clandestine E&E mechanisms, for contacting and assisting military personnel isolated in enemy or unfriendly territory, must be considered in planning E&E operations.

For planning purposes, the following phases of clandestine E&E effort are anticipated:

(a) Period Prior to and Concurrent with Out-Break of Hostilities. Only limited clandestine assets will be in-place in denied areas. Introduction of UW forces into enemy-controlled areas will depend upon the situation prevailing incident to tactical and strategic operations and the known reactions of dissident indigenous personnel.

(b) Post D-Day Period (D - 10 to D - 180). Operations initiated to introduce and/or exploit clandestine E&E assets in unfriendly territory. Unconventional warfare forces deployed into selected UW areas. Rudimentary E&E mechanisms established. Contact areas and procedures established and implemented. Safe Areas, contact areas and procedures and combat crew briefings modified as dictated by available intelligence and US and/or Allied operations underway. Recovery operations begun.

(c) Post D-Day (D - 180 to Indefinite Period). Organized US and Allied operations underway. Both UW and organized friendly indigenous groups actively operating in enemy territory. Clandestine E&E mechanisms are well developed. Joint recovery operations have been implemented and evaders and escapers are being returned to friendly control. Communication system activated to maintain contact with prisoners of war and to exploit this contact.

Safe (Survival) Areas. USCINCEUR has designated Safe Areas (Appendix 4) within area of coordinating responsibility. Personnel subject to isolation in enemy territory will be briefed on Safe Areas appropriate to pre-planned operational actions.

Contact Areas and Recognition Procedures.

Localized contact areas within or adjacent to Safe Areas will be established. Pre-Mission preparation and study will include the distinguishing geographical features of these areas for the easiest practical identification for the evader/escaper.

Contact procedures which will facilitate contact between the evader/escaper and the E&E mechanism will be developed by SWPE in coordination with COMSOTFE.

Until such time as localized contact areas and procedures are established, the burden of contacting the evader/escaper is placed upon the capability of the E&E mechanism to determine that the individual is in the area and then to contact him. No specific contact action is required of the evader/escaper.

USCINCEUR/SACEUR SAFE (SURVIVAL) AREAS

(S) The Safe Areas selected by USCINCEUR/SACEUR and listed below are identified by a single latitude and longitude coordinate. This single coordinate indicates the center point of a circular area 16 kilometers (10 miles) in diameter. The size of the Safe Area should not be considered restrictive from a survival or security standpoint. It's size is limited primarily to confine the area of contact for a recovery mechanism. The evaders eventual recovery will be facilitated by his ability to remain as near the center point as possible.

(S) The Safe Areas listed in this Tab provide the evader/escaper with recommended areas in which survival is possible. These areas offer the best potential for recovery operations.

(S) Some of the Safe Areas selected by USCINCEUR/SACEUR are coincident or proximate to similar areas listed in Tab B. For easy reference such Safe Areas listed in Tab B are shown in parenthesis following the USCINCEUR/SACEUR designation.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>WAC Chart</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
USSR	SR-1 (SR-P)	249	4430N-3845E
	SR-2	325	4300N-4530E
	SR-3	325	4042N-4534E
	SR-4	325	4055N-4409E
	SR-5	325	4100N-4830E
	SR-6	324	4353N-4159E
	SR-7	324	4302N-4145E
	SR-8	250	4440N-3410E
	SR-9	250	4705N-2830E
	SR-10	232	4815N-2410E
	SR-11	233	5135N-2600E

<u>Country</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>WAC Chart</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
<u>USSR</u>	SR-12	168	5230N-2800E
	SR-13	167	5330N-3130E
	SR-14	168	5540N-2200E
	SR-15	153	5625N-2510E
	SR-16 (SR-S)	153	5705N-2210E
	SR-17	153	5745N-2500E
	SR-18	153	5845N-2850E
	SR-19 (SR-C)	154	5640N-3410E
	SR-20	102	6035N-3430E
	SR-21 (SR-B)	103	6340N-3120E
	SR-22	91	6715N-3130E
	SR-23 (SR-A)	51	6825N-3230E
	SR-24	94	6730N-6500E
	SR-25	101	6330N-5450E
	SR-26	92	6415N-4000E
	SR-28	154	5930N-4100E
	SR-29 (SR-E)	156	5853N-5547E
	SR-30	155	5735N-5055E
	SR-31	154	5740N-4400E
	SR-32	156	5615N-5730E
	SR-33	164	5445N-5900E
	SR-34	166	5355N-4215E
	SR-35	167	5230N-3400E
	SR-36 (SR-M)	235	5040N-4415E
	SR-37 (SR-K)	234	4911N-3925E

<u>Country</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>WAC Chart</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
USSR	SR-38	235	5010N-4845E
	SR-39	235	4815N-4430E
	SR-40	249	4730N-3930E
	SR-41 (SR-H)	166	5335N-4530E

(C) The Safe Areas listed in this Tab have been selected by the Chief of Staff, USAF as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and offer the evader/escaper a location believed to be the most favorable for survival.

(S) A review is conducted periodically to determine the radiological fallout category for each area selected. These categories are identified as follows:

Category 1 - Good probability that the area will not be subject to fallout.

Category 2 - Fair probability that the area will not be subject to fallout.

Category 3 - Area will be subject to fallout, but probably not to a high concentration.

Category 4 - Suitable for use in limited war in which nuclear weapons are not employed, but not recommended for use after execution of the Emergency War Order, because of the probability of high concentration of fallout.

SAFE (SURVIVAL) AREAS APPROVED FOR JOINT USAGE

<u>Country</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>WAC Chart</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Category</u>
USSR	SR-A	51-1	6840N-3300E 6815N-3300E 6815N-3145E	3
	SR-B	103-1	6350N-3030E 6340N-3210E 6310N-3140E	1
	SR-C	154-1	5643N-3400E 5643N-3420E 5638N-3420E	4
	SR-D	155-1	5738N-5145E 5738N-5205E 5730N-5205E	4
	SR-E	156-1	5859N-5540E 5858N-5555E 5848N-5555E	4
	SR-F	156-2	5620N-5725E 5620N-5740E 5610N-5740E	3
	SR-G	164-1	5245N-6330E 5245N-6430E 5220N-6430E	3
	SR-H	166-1	5341N-4530E 5330N-4515E 5330N-4540E	4
	SR-I	234-1	4907N-3450E 4907N-3510E 4900N-3510E	4
	SR-J	234-2	4917N-3655E 4917N-3715E 4910N-3715E	4
	SR-K	234-3	4915N-3915E 4915N-3932E 4908N-3932E 4908N-3915E	4
	SR-L	234-4	4945N-4200E 4945N-4219E 4935N-4217E 4935N-4200E	3

<u>Country</u>	<u>Designations</u>	<u>WAC Chart</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Category</u>
<u>USSR</u>	SR-M	235-1	5045N-4405E 5045N-4430E 5030N-4430E 5030N-4405E	3
	SR-N	235-2	5015N-4630E 5015N-4652E 5005N-4652E 5005N-4630E	4
	SR-O	244-1	4755N-8900E 4755N-7950E 4730N-7950E 4730N-7900E	2
	SR-P	249-1	4440N-3830E 4440N-3900E 4425N-3900E 4425N-3830E	4
	SR-Q	249-2	4630N-3815E 4630N-3837E 4618N-3837E 4618N-3815E	3
	SR-R	324-1	4350N-3930E 4350N-4020E 4320N-4020E	1
	SR-S	153-1	5710N-2215E 5710N-2200E 5700N-2200E 5700N-2215E	2

- * Denotes Safe (Survival) Area having published Safe Area Brief.
- # Denotes Safe (Survival) Area having published Safe Area Intelligence Description (SAID).
- o Denotes Safe (Survival) Area having published Special E&E Study.

ANNEX G

TECHNICAL SERVICES

GENERAL.

Purpose: To establish basic policies and procedures for the Technical Services Division (TSD) wartime program and to outline the preparatory actions and plans therefor.

Categories of Services: As employed in this Annex, the term "technical services" embraces authentication, technical aids, research and development, and technical training.

Authentication is the process of providing an agent with the surface proof and outward appearance of being the person he purports to be. It includes: Cover legend to account for agent's movement and presence in a target area; personal identity and permissive documents; authentication intelligence; clothing and accessories to match cover story; evasion and escape aids; operational disguise; postal intelligence, analysis, and fabrication; analysis of suspected documents and legends for counterespionage determination; and imitative printing for UW or covert psychological warfare use.

Technical aids include: Provision of audio and photographic surveillance in nondenied areas; furnishing secret writing and associated services, including covert opening of mail, chemical censorship, and related chemical activities; special devices and techniques employed in sabotage and unconventional warfare.

Research is conducted at Headquarters. It is aimed at the development of improved authentication, technical aids, and the creation of advanced intelligence collection systems.

Technical training is conducted in TSD skills and subjects as directed to meet CS needs.

Peacetime Organization for Planning:

Chief, TSD, is responsible for the general direction, review, and coordination of all TSD war planning and preparations in support of the Agency's wartime mission.

Technical planning assistance will be provided for all domestic and foreign areas as follows:

- (a) All countries under SWPE: Chief, TSD/Frankfurt.
- (b) All countries under SWPPAC: Chief, TSD/Yokosuka.

Character of Operations: CIA clandestine operations under this plan will fall into three principal categories: military support operations, nontheater operations, and exceptional operations.

(1) Military Support Operations: This class of activities is controlled by the Command Relationships Agreement. CIA prewar planning and wartime action in such operations will be responsive to, or in anticipation of, military plans. The Military Support Annex (Annex A) to this plan, as an agreement with the Department of Defense, defines the criteria for determining the details of type and degree of action to be undertaken by CIA in support of military requirements. Although peacetime planning and development of assets must be covert, special attention is called to the following provisions of the Command Relationships Agreement:

"The CIA Force will be utilized to the maximum extent practicable in any military situation where its specialized techniques and intrinsic capabilities can contribute effectively to the attainment of military objectives."

"The definition of 'Covert Operations'...contains a requirement that those operations must be so planned and conducted that any U.S. responsibility for them can, if uncovered, be plausibly denied by the U.S. Government. This requirement does not necessarily apply to all CIA operations conducted in support of military operations."

(2) Nontheater Operations: These operations are normally conducted outside the jurisdiction of any U.S. military theater commander, and therefore will not usually involve the relationships established by the Command Relationships Agreement. The objectives and the character of such operations will come from the national policy level in the same manner as present cold war activities, recognizing, of course, that national policy in wartime will be reoriented to war objectives. However, some nontheater operations may be mounted from or staged through a theater of war where American forces are engaged. Those phases of such operations carried on within a theater will be coordinated with appropriate military authorities. Normally, this coordination will be accomplished with the Theater Commander by the CIA Commander, but, if the operation has delicate political or diplomatic implications, it will be coordinated in the same manner as an exceptional operation. For planning purposes, it will be assumed that such operations will have the same espionage, counterintelligence, psychological, political, economic, or paramilitary character as in present cold war activities, that they will be subject to essentially the same limitations and

and controls, and that they will be conducted in a manner similar to current cold war activities.

(3) Exceptional Operations: As recognized by the Command Relationships Agreement, these will be the CIA operations required by national policy to be conducted independently of the military theater although within, mounted from, or staged through the theater. Exceptional operations will be coordinated with the JCS. CIA, through the JCS, will inform the U.S. Theater Commander insofar as is necessary to ensure coordination. The JCS will direct the military support required, if any, and will provide the necessary guidance to the U.S. Theater Commander. While it is impossible to categorize all operations which will fall under the term "Exceptional", they will in general comprise the following unusual or significant contributions to the over-all war effort:

- (a) Overthrow of hostile governments through political action.
- (b) The elimination or neutralization of hostile individuals or groups through means of kidnapping or methods not involving normal UW techniques.
- (c) The establishment and maintenance of governments (other than those cooperating with the Theater Commander) which hold out a promise of greater postwar cooperation to the United States.
- (d) Espionage, counterintelligence, psychological warfare, or political action against allies of the United States.
- (e) Operations of great sensitivity and promise, knowledge of which it is in the national interest to restrict to the minimum number of people.

Weapons: CIA will be prepared to use nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons in clandestine operations in general war as feasible, subject to approval by the President before actual use is undertaken. CIA will consider the possibilities for clandestine use of radiological weapons in general war, and will seek policy approval of plans for their use as feasibility may be indicated.

ANNEX C

ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

TASKS.

In Peacetime:

Deputy Director (Support) will:

Develop support plans and programs in preparation for headquarters and overseas wartime operations, headquarters emergency redeployment, and the mobilization of support assets.

Negotiate arrangements with appropriate Defense Agencies for obtaining support priorities and allocations consistent with the wartime mission of CIA.

Establish, in conjunction with the appropriate operating element, and maintain strategic reserves for wartime.

Provide technical direction and assistance to Senior War Planners in the preparation of theater support requirements.

Coordinate with the Department of Defense and other executive agencies on support matters of mutual concern.

Conduct continuous review of support plans, programs, and preparations to ensure adequate preparedness for war, and recommend approval of same.

Senior War Planners will:

Prepare appropriate theater support plans.

Develop the support requirements for CIA theater operations.

Coordinate with the Theater Military Commander and the individual Military Services, as appropriate, on support matters of mutual concern.

LOGISTICS

SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AND BASIS FOR PLANNING.

Requirements:

The Senior War Planner, pre-D-day, will determine CIA wartime operational and administrative materiel requirements in coordination with CIA Headquarters and field stations. He will levy approved materiel requirements for standard military items on appropriate theater commanders for placement in their unconventional warfare reserve. The Senior War Planner will levy requirements for Agency type items on CIA Headquarters for placement in Agency strategic reserve.

CIA Headquarters will provide Senior War Planners guidance, as necessary, in the determination of CIA operational and administrative materiel requirements.

The Senior War Planner will determine CIA wartime requirements for administrative items peculiar to the Agency. He will ensure that a ninety-day level of supply of these type administrative items are stocked and maintained at appropriate sites overseas. These administrative items are of the type required by the Agency for operations, or administrative reports, which cannot be furnished by the Military Services.

Supply:

Based on planned requirements, Headquarters will initiate action pre-D-day to have available in appropriate overseas and CONUS storage areas, stocks of items not normally procurable through military channels, and those items peculiar to CIA required to support Department of Defense and CIA post-D-day operations.

Post-D-day:

In active theaters of war, according to agreements with Department of Defense, theater commanders will provide standard items of military equipment to CIA component forces. In areas not in active theaters of war, logistical support for UW operations will be coordinated between CIA and appropriate commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Items peculiar to CIA will be provided by CIA CONUS depots or field support bases to CIA and Department of Defense activities in accordance with predetermined and/or subsequent operational requirements.

LOGISTICS (continued)

Support from Department of State and General Services Administration will be in accordance with current agreements.

Transportation:

Pre-D-day, Senior War Planners will submit to the appropriate theater commanders estimated requirements for priorities and allocations for air and/or surface transportation:

For intertheater and intratheater movement of personnel and materiel.

For theater to CONUS movement of personnel and materiel.

TECHNICAL SERVICES (continued)

(c) All other areas, domestic and foreign: Chief, TSD/Plans (Headquarters). This element may provide additional assistance for (a) and (b) above.

Wartime Overseas Organization: See Annex B.

MISSION.

Plan and provide technical services for CIA/CS wartime operations and for clandestine and unconventional warfare activities of the U.S. Armed Services.

WARTIME ACTIVATION AND OPERATIONS.

Headquarters:

Evacuation -- First Phase: All TSD Headquarters personnel will proceed to a predetermined evacuation site. The primary objective in this phase is survival. If fixed technical facilities are not available at this site, mobile technical facilities will be utilized to provide some degree of technical capability.

Redeployment--Second Phase: All available TSD personnel will move from the evacuation site to the redeployment site. The primary objective in this phase is the resumption of all TSD Headquarters functions. This site will contain fixed technical facilities, which may be augmented by mobile facilities.

Overseas:

Evacuation -- First Phase: All TSD personnel will proceed to designated evacuation sites in accordance with station and base plans.

Redeployment--Second Phase: All TSD personnel within a given theater will proceed to a redeployment site in accordance with SWP-Theater Commander plans. Technical facilities will be available at this site to permit the performance of the TSD mission. Initially, technical capabilities will be maintained on a reduced scale through the use of mobile facilities provided by the Department of Defense. Capabilities will increase through the use of fixed facilities as soon as possible.

Overseas: (Continued)

Operations: TSD personnel and facilities will be used in support of Agency and military operations as directed by the CIA Theater Commander. TSD Headquarters will provide services and equipment not available from the field units.

TASKS.

Peacetime:

TSD Headquarters will:

Prepare plans for the evacuation and redeployment of all TSD Headquarters personnel and the re-establishment of TSD functions.

Review and coordinate all theater, area, station, and base plans affecting TSD personnel, facilities, and functions.

Provide planning assistance as required by the Emergency Planning Officer, Senior War Planners, and other CIA officials.

TSD Field will:

Provide planning assistance as stated in paragraph 1c(2)

Each Senior War Planner will:

Ensure that adequate provision is made in theater, area station, and base plans for continuation of TSD functions. Steps to be taken in conjunction with TSD planning elements are as follows:

Mobile Base Facilities: Determine requirements for vehicles and equipment to be furnished on a non-reimbursable basis by the Department of Defense in accordance with provisions of Tab D to Appendix 3 to Annex A, Global War Plan.

Fixed Facilities: Conduct surveys in the vicinity of proposed or selected redeployment sites to determine the availability of industrial establishments that could be adapted for use as fixed technical service facilities.

Develop military and Agency estimates of hot war requirements for technical services in support of Agency and military operations. Assistance in accomplishing this task is available as follows:

Utilization of procedures for requisitioning and handling CIA peculiar items. (Paragraph 2e, Tab D to Appendix 3 to Annex A, Global War Plan.)

Utilization of data and procedures contained in CSI-F No. 220-8, pertaining to photographic, audio, and other special devices fields.

Assistance and information from TSD plans elements concerning development of authentication requirements and other categories of technical services.

Wartime:

TSD Headquarters will:

Establish, maintain, and operate facilities in the ZI, capable of handling requirements received and anticipated.

Assist TSD theater elements in whatever degree is necessary to support Agency and military operations.

TSD Field will: Provide technical services for military and Agency operations as required by the CIA Theater Commander.

CIA Theater Commander will: Apply TSD capabilities as appropriate in support of military and Agency operations.

SUPPLY.

TSD-developed stock-numbered items will be available through Office of Logistics facilities. To ensure technical suitability and proper utilization, TSD will exercise staff control over the issuance of TSD stock-numbered items.

TSD custom-made items, not assigned stock numbers, will be available through TSD facilities. Such items would include documents, clothing, accessories, secret writing systems, concealment devices, and others.